博弈论视角下的 PPP 模式政府监管研究

PPP 模式在我国公共服务领域的应用日益广泛,越来越多的问题也随之暴露,其中较为突出的是政府监管问题。政府和私人部门的合作,本质上是二者之间博弈的结果。本文以博弈论的视角分别从宏观和微观两个层面利用 4 种博弈模型来分析 PPP 模式下私人部门与政府之间的博弈过程,发现政府监管问题的关键在于促进私人部门积极履约。由此结合我国 PPP模式下政府监管的不足给出如何加强政府监管的合理建议,旨在促进 PPP 模式在我国的发展     

Why contracts fail: a game theoretic approach to managing urban water

In developing countries, urban water is often provided by public private partnership (PPP). However, PPPs remain highly contentious, with many contracts renegotiated or stalled. Prima facie, this stems from issues in the French model of contract design between two parties – the government and the private operator. Critics point out that in reality, the PPP is a tri-party exchange of promises, services and fees linking the interests of the private operator, the government and the people. We propose a game theoretic analysis comparing a two-party contracting model with a tri-party one, which is tested against a real-world experiment in the water utilities in Manila and Jakarta. Paradoxically, we ?nd that a tri-party contracting model, though analytically more faithful in separating the interest of the government from the consumers’ leads to sub-optimal outcomes. In practical terms, we ?nd that an independent regulator may not generate better outcomes.     

Total emission control for managing regional water quality: a game theoretic decision process

A simple game theoretic model with hierarchical structure is developed for regulating the total amount of pollutant discharged by all the effluent producers in a given region, where the allowable limit on total emission, that is the environmental carrying capacity, is assumed to be given. It is proposed that the total emission is to be allocated amongst all the polluters so as to maximize the social benefit, and that the social benefit is to be allocated through taxation on the companies under the criterion of impartiality. The concept of impartiality is defined as equal individual satisfaction for the polluters who cooperate. This concept is applied to solve the characteristic function game. A numerical example is included.     

关于旧城改造中公众参与机制的探讨

快速的城市化进程和社会的发展推进着旧城改造的过程。为了保证旧城改造的顺利进行,公众参与旧城改造具有非常重要的意义。本对旧城改造中公众参与的机制进行了初步地设计研究,并提出了完善的建议。     

Selection of government supervision mode of PPP projects during the operation stage

During the operation stage of public-private partnership (PPP) projects, investors may engage in opportunistic behaviour in pursuit of their own profits. In order to curb this kind of behaviour, this article analyses the selection of government supervision mode based on evolutionary game theory taking the perspective of government supervision. The results show that government supervision mode is closely related to the probability of identifying investors’ speculative behaviour through outcome-oriented supervision. When the probability of identifying such behaviour is relatively high, the equilibrium strategy of investors and governmental supervision institutions is (not to behave opportunistically, outcome-oriented supervision). In contrast, if the probability is relatively low, there is no set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS); rather, a periodic behavioural pattern is formed. In this scenario, the strategies ultimately chosen by both sides relate to initial states and the payoffs of the options. Furthermore, determinants and some recommendations for government supervision are proposed, providing a reference for efficient governance.     

基于三方博弈的保障性住房选址机制研究--博弈失衡与角色重构

本文在对我国保障性住房空间布局的问题和建设模式综合分析的基础上,从三方博弈的角度,探讨了低收入居民的社会需求、开发商的经济诉求和政府对综合效益的平衡,指出我国保障性住房边缘化集中布局、职住分离、公共服务设施缺乏等问题根本上是源于因为政府主导、开发商偏向和低收入居民话语权缺失而失衡的三方选址博弈机制。最后通过借鉴美国保障性住房建设中角色激励的经验,提出了拓宽社会投资渠道、对开发商采用制度激励、强化公众参与和城市规划引导和控制能力等重构策略。     

建设项目全寿命期管理模式及其博弈分析

对比分析了建设项目全寿命期管理的主要模式及其优缺点,指出业主—代理人模式的合理可行性。在此模式下对业主和代理人之间的博弈行为进行了分析,提出了在满足业主利益最大化的情况下代理人行为选择发生的概率,为业主签订代理合同时降低风险提供了一定的参考。     

基于博弈论的有害功能识别方法研究

为了对有害功能的事前处理提供行为决策依据,提出了基于博弈论的有害功能动态识别方法。基于TRIZ中的效应研究有害功能的形成原因并对有害功能进行分类;建立效应空间博弈模型,确定各效应的效用函数,提出一种有害功能动态识别算法;应用该方法完成ATM机纠偏模块的设计。研究表明,该方法较好地完成了有害功能的动态识别,具有一定有效性与可行性。     

民爆器材安全生产形势分析与对策措施概述

通过对民爆器材企业安全生产事故统计、安全生产现状、安全生产薄弱环节等三方面进行分析,并根据行业安全评价现状和安全生产趋势,从安全技术管理、安全技术保障等方面提出了应采取的相关对策.     

基于博弈论的WiFi接入资源动态分配算法

无线共享网络的接入资源分散,容量有限,且价格互有差异,为了在保证用户满意度的同时提高运营商总体收益,需要对网络接入资源进行合理分配.因此,提出了一个基于博弈论的WiFi接入资源动态分配算法.首先,以总收益最大化为目标,兼顾用户满意度,建立基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈的网络接入资源动态分配模型;其次,通过两阶段博弈,运营商制定价格策略,激励用户执行网络选择策略,提出基于粒子群算法的网络资源动态分配求解算法,得出最优的网络价格及资源分配.仿真实验表明,算法能够实现接入资源的合理分配,在用户满意的同时实现运营商收益最大化.